1. Bibliographic Information

1.1. Title

On the role of theories in consciousness science

1.2. Authors

Biyu J. He. The author is affiliated with the Parekh Center for Interdisciplinary Neurology at NYU Grossman School of Medicine, as indicated in the acknowledgements.

1.3. Journal/Conference

The paper is published in Nature Mental Health. Nature journals are highly prestigious and influential in their respective scientific fields, signifying a high standard of peer review and widespread readership.

1.4. Publication Year

2025

1.5. Abstract

Consciousness Science is currently experiencing significant growth and opportunity due to empirical, theoretical, and technological advancements. This paper emphasizes the critical need to re-evaluate the role of theories in this maturing field. The author argues for a more nuanced approach, cautioning against the uniformity assumption (the belief that a single theory can explain all aspects of consciousness) and the idolization of existing theories. Instead, the paper advocates for the development of humbler, more focused, and experimentally testable theories with clearly defined explanatory scopes. This approach, exemplified by insights from other scientific disciplines, aims to accelerate progress, foster new ideas, and ensure a robust, closed-loop interaction between theory and experiment in consciousness research.

1.6. Original Source Link

The official source link is: https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-025-00361-z. The PDF link is: https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-025-00361-z.pdf. This paper has been officially published online as of 2025-11-26.

2. Executive Summary

2.1. Background & Motivation

The field of Consciousness Science is currently experiencing a period of rapid development and increased interest, driven by advancements in empirical research, theoretical models, and neuroscientific technologies. However, the paper identifies a crucial challenge: the appropriate role of theories in this evolving domain. The author notes that discussions, debates, and even controversies have recently arisen regarding how theories should function in a maturing science of consciousness.

The core problem addressed is that existing approaches often lead to pitfalls such as confirmation bias and entrenchment of dominant theories. A significant underlying issue is the common uniformity assumption, which posits that a single theory should explain all facets of conscious awareness. This assumption can lead to theories being vaguely defined, having unclear explanatory scopes, and being difficult to test, ultimately hindering scientific progress and fostering unproductive adversarial debates. The paper is motivated by a desire to steer the field towards a more productive, rigorous, and dynamic theoretical landscape.

2.2. Main Contributions / Findings

The paper offers a critical perspective and proposes a constructive path forward for the role of theories in consciousness science. Its primary contributions and findings are:

• Critique of the Uniformity Assumption: The paper identifies the uniformity assumption (the belief that one principle or set of principles will explain all aspects of conscious awareness) as a major obstacle to progress. It argues that this assumption prematurely broadens the explanatory scope of theories, leading to confusion and unproductive competition.
• Advocacy for Humbler Theories: The author advocates for relaxing the uniformity assumption and allowing theories to have humbler, more focused, and clearly outlined explanatory scopes. This approach encourages theories to target specific phenomena within consciousness (e.g., sensory access to awareness, object perception, felt emotions, enabling conditions).
• Emphasis on Testability and Specificity: The paper highlights that theories should be simplifying, have predictive power, and be testable by generating falsifiable hypotheses. By focusing on narrower explanatory targets, theories can become more concrete, specify neural mechanisms, and thus be more readily testable experimentally.
• Distinction between Theory and Framework: It provides clear definitions, explaining that a theory offers plausible principles to explain a phenomenon with predictive power and testability, while a framework is a broader way to organize concepts, which may not be directly testable.
• Lessons from Other Fields: The paper draws parallels with Hebbian plasticity in neuroscience (where exceptions don't invalidate the core theory) and activity-silent working memory theory (as an example of a focused, testable theory with clear neural mechanisms) to illustrate the benefits of a more nuanced theoretical approach.
• Promotion of a Boots-on-the-Ground Approach: This approach encourages the proposal of new, independent, and fresh theoretical ideas by younger researchers, moving away from merely testing existing dominant theories.
• Call for Closed-Loop Experiment-Theory Interaction: The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for theories to guide experiments and experiments to, in turn, lead to new or refined theories, forming a synergistic cycle for groundbreaking insights.

3. Prerequisite Knowledge & Related Work

3.1. Foundational Concepts

To fully appreciate the arguments presented in this paper, a novice reader should understand several key concepts related to consciousness science and the philosophy of science.

• Consciousness Science: This interdisciplinary field seeks to understand the nature, function, and neural basis of consciousness. It draws from philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and computer science. Consciousness itself refers to the state of being aware of one's own existence and surroundings, encompassing subjective experiences, thoughts, feelings, and perceptions.
• Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC): Introduced by Francis Crick and Christof Koch, NCC refers to the minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one specific conscious percept or experience. In simpler terms, it's about identifying the specific brain activity that corresponds to a conscious experience. The search for NCC was a foundational empirical approach that helped establish modern consciousness science.
• Theory vs. Framework: The paper provides clear definitions for these terms:
  • Theory: A plausible principle or body of principles designed to explain a phenomenon. A good theory should be:
    • Simplifying: It should help with understanding by reducing complexity.
    • Predictive: It should have the power to forecast future observations or outcomes.
    • Have a clearly outlined explanatory scope: It should specify the target phenomenon it aims to explain.
    • Testable: It must be able to generate falsifiable hypotheses (i.e., predictions that can be proven wrong by experiment).
    • It does not necessarily have to be comprehensive (e.g., a psychological theory doesn't need to specify neural implementation).
  • Framework: A way to organize concepts or a way of thinking about a phenomenon. Frameworks tend to be broader than theories and may or may not be directly testable. They provide a structure for understanding without necessarily offering specific, falsifiable explanations.
• Prominent Theories of Consciousness (brief overview): The paper mentions several influential theories, which are central to the current theoretical landscape. Understanding their basic premise helps contextualize the author's discussion of explanatory scope and entrenchment.
  • Global (Neuronal) Workspace Theory (GWT/GNWT): This theory proposes that conscious experience arises when information becomes globally available to many different brain systems through a "global workspace" (a kind of broadcasting system in the brain). Non-conscious information is processed locally, but conscious information is widely accessible.
  • Integrated Information Theory (IIT): IIT posits that consciousness corresponds to a system's capacity to integrate information. It suggests that a system is conscious to the extent that it has a large repertoire of internal states that are both highly differentiated (many possible states) and highly integrated (the states are causally constrained by the system as a whole, not just individual parts). A key concept in IIT is $Φ (Phi)$, a measure of integrated information, though its calculation is complex and often debated.
  • Recurrent Processing Theory: This theory emphasizes the role of recurrent (feedback) processing in the brain for conscious perception. While initial, feedforward processing can occur non-consciously, it is thought that conscious awareness requires sustained, recurrent interactions between different brain areas, allowing for elaborated and stabilized representations.
  • Higher-Order Theory (HOT): This theory suggests that a mental state becomes conscious when there is a "higher-order" thought or representation about that state. For example, you don't just see red; you have a thought that you are seeing red. This higher-order thought itself is not necessarily conscious but makes the underlying state conscious.
  • Predictive Processing Theory: This framework, often applied to consciousness, posits that the brain constantly generates predictions about incoming sensory information and updates these predictions based on prediction errors (discrepancies between prediction and actual input). Consciousness, in this view, might be linked to the brain's internal models, the process of minimizing prediction error, or particular aspects of these models.
• Hebbian Plasticity: Proposed by Donald Hebb in 1949, this is a fundamental principle in neuroscience: "Neurons that fire together wire together." It means that if two neurons (nerve cells) are repeatedly active at the same time, the strength of the connection (synapse) between them increases, making them more likely to fire together in the future. This is a mechanism for learning and memory in the brain.
• Anti-Hebbian Plasticity: This refers to synaptic modifications that are opposite to Hebbian plasticity. Instead of strengthening connections when neurons fire together, anti-Hebbian plasticity might weaken them or strengthen them when neurons fire out of sync. It is thought to serve functions like preventing runaway excitation, decorrelating neural signals (making them less similar), and maintaining a balance between excitation and inhibition in neural circuits.
• Activity-Silent Working Memory Theory: This theory proposes that working memory (the ability to hold and manipulate information for a short period) can be maintained not only by continuous, persistent neural activity (neurons firing constantly) but also by "activity-silent" mechanisms. These mechanisms might involve transient changes in synaptic strengths (the connections between neurons) that can be reactivated when needed, without requiring ongoing firing.
• Persistent Activity in Working Memory: This is an earlier and well-established theory of working memory, which posits that information is held in working memory by neurons continuously firing at an elevated rate, maintaining a stable representation of the information over time.

3.2. Previous Works

The paper is a commentary on the current state of consciousness science and its theoretical landscape, rather than presenting a new empirical study or a brand-new theory. As such, the "previous works" it refers to are broadly the historical development and existing dominant theories in the field, as well as recent discussions about the scientific status of consciousness theories.

• Birth of Modern Consciousness Science: The author traces the beginning of modern consciousness science to around 1990, specifically referencing the work of Francis Crick and Christof Koch. Their advocacy helped usher in an age of empirical neuroscientific research focused on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). (Ref. 1)
• Establishment of Prominent Theories: The paper highlights the proposals of several influential theories around 20-25 years ago, which significantly contributed to building a strong research community. These include Global (Neuronal) Workspace Theory (GWT/GNWT) (Ref. 3), Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Ref. 4), and Recurrent Processing Theory (Ref. 5). More recently, Higher-order theory (Ref. 6) and Predictive processing theory (Ref. 7, 8) have also gained prominence.
• Discussions on the Scientific Status of Theories: The author explicitly states that the role of theories is a "topic that has undergone considerate discussions, debate, and even controversy² recently." This refers to meta-scientific discussions about what makes a theory of consciousness scientific or testable, as exemplified by a recent publication by Klincewicz et al. (Ref. 2).
• Adversarial Collaborations: A significant recent development mentioned is the investment of $20-30 million by the Templeton World Charity Foundation into five adversarial collaboration projects. These projects involve large, international consortia designed to "pit theories against each other" empirically. This initiative reflects the current emphasis on directly testing and comparing dominant theories.
• Critique of Current Theoretical Landscape: The paper implicitly builds on critiques (e.g., Yaron et al., Ref. 12) regarding potential pitfalls of the current theoretical landscape, such as confirmation bias and the entrenchment of dominant theories. The author's own previous work (He, 2023, Ref. 11), proposing the Joint Determinant Theory (JDT) as a framework for a pluralistic neurobiological understanding, also forms part of the background, as she deliberately labeled JDT as a framework due to its initial vagueness, reflecting the distinction she emphasizes in this paper.

3.3. Technological Evolution

The paper contextualizes the discussion on theories within the broader technological and scientific evolution of consciousness science:

• From Philosophy to Neuroscience: Historically, consciousness was primarily a domain of philosophical inquiry. The work of Crick and Koch in the 1990s marked a significant shift, bringing it firmly into the realm of empirical neuroscience. This transition was enabled by nascent neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques that allowed researchers to observe brain activity in relation to conscious experience.
• Advances in Neuroscience Technology: The paper explicitly mentions "technological advances in neuroscience" as a key factor in the field's current unprecedented opportunity. These advancements include:
  • Improved Neuroimaging: Techniques like fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), EEG (Electroencephalography), MEG (Magnetoencephalography), and intracranial recordings (e.g., ECoG, electrocorticography) have become more sophisticated, offering higher spatial and temporal resolution, allowing for more precise measurement of brain activity during conscious states.
  • Computational Neuroscience: Advances in computational modeling allow for the simulation of complex neural networks, providing tools to formally articulate theories and generate specific predictions.
  • Genetic and Optogenetic Tools: These tools, primarily in animal models, enable precise manipulation of specific neuronal populations and circuits, opening new avenues for causal investigation of consciousness-related mechanisms.
  • Data Science and Machine Learning: These fields provide powerful tools for analyzing vast datasets generated by neuroscientific experiments, identifying patterns, and making predictions about conscious states.
• Position of the Paper: This paper fits within the current stage where the field has accumulated significant empirical data and multiple prominent theories. It reflects a meta-scientific concern about how to best leverage these advancements and theoretical models to foster genuine progress rather than stagnation or unproductive debate. It's a call for methodological refinement in theoretical development, ensuring that theories remain effective tools for scientific discovery in a rapidly advancing technological landscape.

3.4. Differentiation Analysis

This paper does not propose a new empirical method or a specific theory of consciousness. Instead, its innovation lies in its meta-scientific critique and prescriptive advice on how theories should function within the maturing field of consciousness science.

Compared to previous works that either propose specific theories of consciousness (e.g., IIT, GWT) or engage in empirical comparisons of these theories (e.g., adversarial collaborations), this paper differentiates itself by:

• Shifting Focus from What to How: Rather than asking "What is consciousness?" or "Which theory is correct?", this paper asks "What role should theories play?" and "How can we develop better theories and use them more effectively?". It's a commentary on the scientific process itself.

• Challenging the Uniformity Assumption: A core differentiation is its direct challenge to the implicit belief that a single, grand theory must explain all aspects of consciousness. Many existing theories, by their nature, often implicitly or explicitly aim for this comprehensive scope. This paper argues that this ambition is premature and detrimental.

• Advocating for Humbler and Focused Theories: While existing theories often attempt to be broad, this paper proposes a deliberate strategy of developing theories with much narrower, well-defined explanatory scopes. This contrasts with the current sociological reality where dominant theories have become "entrenched" and often extend their claims beyond their initial observational bases.

• Emphasizing Testability through Specificity: The paper argues that by being humbler and more focused on particular phenomena (e.g., how sensory information accesses awareness, how emotions are felt), theories can generate more concrete and falsifiable hypotheses at the level of neural mechanisms. This is a direct response to the criticism that some dominant theories (e.g., early formulations of IIT) are notoriously difficult to test.

• Promoting Theoretical Pluralism: By advocating for multiple, focused theories that explain different aspects of consciousness, the paper implicitly promotes a form of theoretical pluralism, where different theories can coexist and complement each other, rather than being in constant adversarial competition over grand unified explanations. This is a departure from the "adversarial collaboration" model which, while valuable for empirical testing, can reinforce the idea of a single "winner."

• Drawing Analogies from Mature Sciences: Its use of examples like Hebbian plasticity and activity-silent working memory from established neuroscience fields provides a unique comparative perspective, suggesting a more pragmatic approach to theory building than often seen in nascent complex fields.

  In essence, while related work focuses on building or testing specific consciousness theories, this paper provides a high-level, critical reflection on the meta-principles for theory construction and engagement within the field, aiming to optimize the scientific process itself.

4. Methodology

This paper is a commentary, so its "methodology" is not a typical empirical or computational one. Instead, it employs a methodology of argumentation, conceptual clarification, and comparative analysis to make its case for a refined approach to theoretical development in consciousness science.

4.1. Principles

The core principle guiding the paper's argument is that Consciousness Science needs a middle-of-the-road, nuanced approach to the role of theories. This means avoiding two extremes: completely abandoning theories in favor of purely empirical data collection, and blindly idolizing or entrenching a few dominant, overly broad theories. The author implicitly bases this principle on the idea that both theory and experiment are indispensable, as highlighted by the anonymous quote: "Theory without experiment is lame. Experiment without theory is blind."

4.2. Core Methodology In-depth (Layer by Layer)

The paper's argument unfolds through a structured process of definition, critique, proposal, and illustrative examples:

4.2.1. Defining Theory and Framework

The author begins by establishing foundational definitions to ensure clarity in the subsequent discussion.

• Definition of Theory: A theory is defined as "a plausible principle or body of principles to explain a phenomenon." Key characteristics of a robust theory are outlined:
  • It should be simplifying (to aid understanding).
  • It should have predictive power (to be useful).
  • It does not have to be comprehensive (e.g., a psychological theory doesn't need to specify neural implementation).
  • It must have a clearly outlined explanatory scope (the target phenomenon it aims to explain).
  • It must be testable, capable of generating falsifiable hypotheses.
• Definition of Framework: A framework is presented as "a way to organize concepts, a way to think about a phenomenon." Frameworks are generally broader than theories and may or may not be directly testable.
  • Example: Marr's three levels of description (computational, algorithmic, implementational) is cited as a useful framework in cognitive science.
  • Consciousness Science Example: The idea that sensory processing can be subliminal, preconscious, or conscious is given as a framework. In contrast, the idea that conscious access involves sensory information crossing a nonlinear bifurcation threshold (from GNWT) is identified as a theory.
  • Self-Reflection: The author reflects on her own Joint Determinant Theory (JDT), stating she deliberately labeled it a framework because it offers a state-space view and suggests that different aspects of conscious content might have different circuit mechanisms, acknowledging its initial vagueness.

4.2.2. Critiquing the Current State of Theories in Consciousness Science

The paper then analyzes the existing landscape of theories, highlighting potential pitfalls.

• Outsized Role: Theories have played an unusually large role in consciousness science compared to other neuroscience and psychology disciplines, often being expected in empirical studies and grant proposals.
• Entrenchment and Adversarial Collaborations: The few dominant theories (e.g., GWT, IIT) have become entrenched, with young researchers often aligning with specific camps. The significant investment in adversarial collaboration projects to "pit theories against each other" further reflects this landscape.
• Pitfalls: The author points out confirmation bias as a common issue, where researchers might unconsciously favor evidence that supports their preferred theory.

4.2.3. Identifying the Dangers of Assuming Uniformity

This is a central part of the argument, proposing a key obstacle to progress.

• The Uniformity Assumption: This is defined as the common belief that "a key principle, or set of principles, will explain all aspects of conscious awareness."
  • Romanticist Vision: The author likens this to the ambition seen in fields like the theory of evolution or the discovery of the double-helix structure of DNA, which provided comprehensive explanations. While acknowledging this romanticist vision might be true, she stresses that the jury is still out.
• Consequences of the Assumption: Believing the uniformity assumption automatically extends the explanatory scope of any consciousness theory to encompass all aspects of awareness, irrespective of its origin. This leads to:
  • Massive confusion and gigantic roadblocks to progress if the assumption is wrong.
  • Theories naturally suited to explaining different phenomena being pitted against each other in an endless cycle.
  • An explanation for why which theory is supported by empirical results can be predicted by the experimental paradigm used by that empirical study (referencing Yaron et al., Ref. 12).

4.2.4. Proposing a Humbler and Focused Approach

The author then articulates her proposed solution.

• Relaxing the Uniformity Assumption: She argues that by relaxing this assumption and allowing theories to be humbler in their explanatory scope, the field could make meaningful progress much faster and avoid a stagnant theoretical landscape.
• Specific Examples of Focused Scopes:
  • A theory explaining how sensory information accesses awareness doesn't need to simultaneously explain differences in sleep, psychedelic states, anesthesia, or disorders of consciousness.
  • A theory for conscious object perception (e.g., grouping) can focus on that specific phenomenon.
  • A theory for enabling conditions for consciousness doesn't need to explain every aspect of awareness (e.g., perception and emotion).
• Benefits of this Attitude: This cultural shift would allow theories to be more focused and likely more experimentally testable. It encourages a "boots-on-the-ground" approach, facilitating the proposal of new theories.
• Long-term Vision: Over time, validated "humbler" theories would provide a firmer ground to examine common principles across different aspects of consciousness. This shift would not diminish the significance of theories at all; it only takes away the grandiosity of theories.

4.2.5. Drawing Analogies from Other Fields

To strengthen her argument, the author provides illustrative examples from established neuroscience.

• Hebbian Plasticity:
  • Theory: "Neurons that fire together wire together" (Donald Hebb, 1949). This is a cornerstone theory confirmed experimentally.
  • Lesson: The existence of anti-Hebbian plasticity (opposite empirical observations) did not "falsify" Hebbian plasticity as a whole. Instead, it led to an appreciation that there are important exceptions and complementary mechanisms. If consciousness science adopted its current model, Hebbian plasticity would have been mistakenly discarded.
• Activity-Silent Working Memory Theory:
  • Theory: Proposed computationally in 2008, it suggests a specific neural implementation of working memory that doesn't rely on persistent activity. It has received direct experimental support.
  • Lesson: This theory has a clear, focused explanatory scope. It complements rather than replaces an earlier theory (persistent activity in working memory). This serves as an ideal example for consciousness science, demonstrating the value of concrete and testable neural mechanisms with clearly outlined explanatory targets.

4.2.6. Conclusion and Call to Action

The paper concludes by reiterating the current opportunities in consciousness science and advocating for a synergistic approach.

• Opportunities: The field is no longer taboo, no longer marginalized, and can leverage technological advances.

• Ideal Approach: Success will come from a closed-loop manner where theories guide experiments and experiments lead to new or refined theories.

• Sociological Benefit: Humbler theories would also empower younger consciousness researchers to pursue fresh, independent ideas rather than being confined to testing existing dominant theories.

  No mathematical formulas, algorithms, or specific experimental protocols are presented in this commentary paper, as its methodology is argumentative and conceptual.

5. Experimental Setup

This paper is a commentary and an opinion piece, not an empirical research study. Therefore, it does not involve any experimental setup, datasets, evaluation metrics, or baseline comparisons. The author presents arguments, conceptual distinctions, and analogies from other scientific fields to support a proposed approach to theoretical development in consciousness science.

5.1. Datasets

Not applicable. This paper does not utilize or analyze any datasets.

5.2. Evaluation Metrics

Not applicable. As a commentary, this paper does not present experimental results that require quantitative evaluation metrics.

5.3. Baselines

Not applicable. This paper does not propose a new model or method that would be compared against baselines. Its "baselines" are the current practices and assumptions in consciousness science regarding the role and scope of theories.

6. Results & Analysis

As a commentary paper, there are no experimental results in the traditional sense (e.g., quantitative data, performance metrics, statistical analyses presented in tables or figures). Instead, the "results" are the conclusions drawn from the author's logical argumentation and comparative analysis, which serve as recommendations for the field.

6.1. Core Results Analysis

The paper's core findings or arguments can be summarized as follows:

• The Uniformity Assumption is a Major Roadblock: The author identifies that the common belief that one grand theory must explain all aspects of consciousness is detrimental. This assumption leads to theories being vaguely defined and applied beyond their initial scope, creating confusion and slowing progress.

• Need for Humbler, Focused Theories: The paper strongly advocates for developing theories with clearly outlined and narrower explanatory scopes. For instance, a theory of conscious perception doesn't need to explain sleep states simultaneously. This specificity makes theories more experimentally testable.

• Current Theoretical Landscape is Problematic: The field currently suffers from entrenched dominant theories and confirmation bias, partly due to the uniformity assumption and the competitive nature of adversarial collaborations when theories are viewed as vying for a single, comprehensive explanation.

• Lessons from Mature Neuroscience: Examples like Hebbian plasticity demonstrate that a theory can remain foundational even with known exceptions, showing that empirical falsification of a part does not necessarily invalidate the whole principle if its scope is appropriately understood. The activity-silent working memory theory highlights the value of focused theories that propose concrete, testable neural mechanisms.

• Path Towards Faster Progress: By adopting a pluralistic and boots-on-the-ground approach (i.e., multiple focused theories, allowing new ideas), consciousness science can accelerate its progress. This shift would foster more testable hypotheses, encourage new theoretical contributions from younger researchers, and ultimately lead to a firmer grounding for examining common principles across consciousness once individual phenomena are better understood.

• Significance of Closed-Loop Experiment-Theory Interaction: The paper concludes that the optimal way forward is a synergistic cycle where theories guide experiments and experiments refine or generate new theories.

  These arguments collectively form the paper's central message: a call for a paradigm shift in how theories are conceived, developed, and utilized within consciousness science.

6.2. Data Presentation (Tables)

Not applicable. This paper does not contain any tables of experimental results.

6.3. Ablation Studies / Parameter Analysis

Not applicable. This paper does not present an empirical study, hence no ablation studies or parameter analyses are conducted.

7. Conclusion & Reflections

7.1. Conclusion Summary

This paper by Biyu J. He provides a timely and critical examination of the role of theories in the maturing field of consciousness science. The core conclusion is that the field should move away from the prevailing uniformity assumption – the romanticized belief that a single, grand theory will explain all aspects of conscious awareness. Instead, it advocates for the development of humbler, more focused theories with clearly defined explanatory scopes. This approach is argued to make theories more experimentally testable, foster new theoretical contributions, and ultimately accelerate meaningful scientific progress. By learning from other mature disciplines, the paper champions a pluralistic view where multiple specific theories can coexist and complement each other, guiding a robust closed-loop interaction between theory and experiment.

7.2. Limitations & Future Work

The paper itself, being a commentary, does not explicitly state limitations of its own argument. However, it implicitly highlights the limitations of the current theoretical landscape in consciousness science:

• Overly Broad Explanatory Scopes: Theories are often assumed to explain all of consciousness, leading to vagueness and difficulty in testing.

• Entrenchment and Confirmation Bias: The dominance of a few theories can lead to researchers aligning with camps and exhibiting confirmation bias.

• Stagnant Theoretical Landscape: The current competitive, winner-take-all mentality hinders the generation of novel theoretical ideas.

  Regarding future work, the paper explicitly suggests several directions for the field:

• Proposing New, Focused Theories: The need for theories that explain specific phenomena, such as "how conscious perception occurs, how felt emotions happen, how conscious thinking unfolds, how intentions and agency are generated by the brain, and what brain state changes render consciousness impossible or altered under sleep, anesthesia, pathological and psychedelic conditions."

• Adopting a Boots-on-the-Ground Approach: This would allow new theories to be more readily proposed and tested.

• Examining Common Principles on Firmer Ground: Once humbler theories are experimentally validated, the field will be better positioned to investigate whether common principles exist across different aspects of consciousness.

• Fostering a Closed-Loop Experiment-Theory Cycle: Encouraging a continuous interaction where theories guide experiments, and experiments lead to the refinement or generation of new theories.

• Freeing Younger Researchers: Creating a scientific culture where junior scientists are empowered to pursue independent, fresh theoretical ideas rather than solely building their careers on testing existing dominant theories.

7.3. Personal Insights & Critique

This paper offers a refreshing and pragmatic perspective that is much needed in consciousness science. Its core argument for humbler, more focused theories is compelling.

Personal Insights:

• Relevance to Other Complex Fields: The challenges highlighted in consciousness science – particularly the uniformity assumption and the idolization of grand theories – are not unique. Many nascent, complex fields grappling with fundamental questions (e.g., origin of life, fundamental physics beyond the Standard Model, general AI) could benefit from this meta-scientific reflection. The temptation for a single "theory of everything" often overshadows the value of incremental, verifiable progress.

• Overcoming "Theory Wars": The emphasis on complementing rather than replacing existing theories (as seen in the working memory example) provides a powerful antidote to unproductive "theory wars." It suggests a pathway where different theories can explain different facets of a phenomenon or operate at different levels of explanation, thereby reducing unnecessary adversarial competition.

• Empowering Next Generation: The sociological point about freeing younger researchers is particularly insightful. A field dominated by a few entrenched theories can stifle creativity and innovation. By lowering the "barrier to entry" for theoretical contributions (i.e., not requiring a new theory to explain everything), it can foster a more vibrant and diverse intellectual landscape.

  Critique / Areas for Improvement:

• Defining "Humbler" Scope in Practice: While the concept of a "humbler" explanatory scope is appealing, practically delineating these scopes can be challenging. Where does conscious perception end and conscious emotion begin? Conscious experiences are inherently intertwined. The paper provides examples, but the operationalization of these boundaries for new theories will be crucial and potentially contentious. The risk is not having a grand theory, but fragmenting the understanding so much that an overarching synthesis becomes impossible or perpetually deferred.

• The Unifying Goal: The paper acknowledges that a romanticist vision of a unified theory might be true. However, by advocating for initial humbler theories, it implicitly pushes the goal of unification further into the future. While this might be a necessary pragmatic step, the field will eventually need mechanisms to integrate these humbler theories into a more coherent, larger picture, which the paper touches upon but does not detail. How do we ensure that these humbler theories are compatible and can eventually be woven together?

• The Role of Frameworks Revisited: The distinction between theory and framework is clear, yet the author's personal reflection on JDT (labeling it a framework but retaining "theory" in the name) highlights the practical ambiguity. This indicates that the lines might often be blurred in practice, and clearer guidelines on when to call something a framework versus a theory (especially for new proposals) might be beneficial for the community to avoid the very vagueness the paper critiques.

  Overall, this paper serves as an important call to temper ambition with scientific rigor, focusing on testability and specificity to ensure that the exciting opportunities in consciousness science translate into robust, cumulative knowledge.